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Divergent Assessments
Without being exhaustive, I compiled a survey of 16 assessments,
using CGE models, of the global consequences of full trade liber-
alization from 1999 to 2005. These studies clearly highlight a
major divergence. From full trade liberalization, the implied
increase in world welfare ranges from 0.3 percent (Hertel and
Keeney 2005) to 3.1 percent (Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi 1999),
results that differ by a factor of more than 10! Estimates of the
number of people lifted out of poverty also range widely, from 72
million (Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005) to
440 million (Cline 2004), differing by a factor of 6.
A simulation of full trade liberalization has also been run at
IFPRI using the MIRAGE model (a full description of this model
is available at www.cepii.fr). It concludes that full trade liberaliza-
tion would increase world real income by 0.33 percent after 10
years of implementation. This trade reform would be develop-
ment-friendly: it would lead to a higher rate of growth in middle-
income countries (0.4 percent) and in least-developed countries
(0.8 percent) than in rich countries (0.3 percent). It would also
contribute to poverty alleviation because gains would go to
unskilled labor in many developing regions, especially in Latin
America and part of Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, full trade liberal-
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he world community and international institutions have made development and poverty alleviation a high
priority. The Millennium Development Goals, fixed by the United Nations for 2015, call for halving the
number of people living on less than a dollar a day. With this goal in mind, the international community is
calling current global trade negotiations, conducted by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Doha
Development Agenda.
Trade liberalization is expected to act positively on development and poverty reduction. The recent empirical
literature identifies several key linkages through which trade liberalization affects development: the price and
availability of goods, factor prices, government transfers, incentives for investment and innovation, terms of
trade, and short-run risk (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004).
The traditional argument in favor of a positive relationship between liberalization and poverty reduction
focuses on the first two linkages. A large proportion of poor people work in the agricultural sector, where trade
distortions are particularly high. Liberalization could lead to higher world agricultural prices and raise activity
and remuneration in this sector in developing countries. The same beneficial outcome could occur in the textile
and apparel sectors, where protection remains high and developing countries have a comparative advantage.
But openness can also have negative effects. First, government transfers can shrink as liberalization cuts the
government’s receipts of trade-related taxes. Second, terms of trade can deteriorate as liberalization affects world
prices. Third, liberalization can impose adjustment costs and raise short-run risk owing to competition from
imports and reallocation of productive factors.
As a consequence, it is uncertain how much trade liberalization would reduce poverty, and many studies have
attempted to assess the size of these benefits. The main empirical tool for this work is the multicountry
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model—a sophisticated and complex tool of analysis that often appears
as a “black box” from which results are difficult to understand.
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of world income distribution (taking into account population
distribution) would be slightly reduced.
Nevertheless, some developing countries might be hurt by this
world reform. Trade liberalization implies allocation efficiency
gains, which are positive in all cases. But liberalization may reduce
some countries’ terms of trade because
soaring world prices of agricultural
commodities would hurt net food
importers (such as Bangladesh, China,
Mexico, and countries in the Middle East
and North Africa) or because preferential
access to certain markets could be eroded
(such as in Bangladesh, Mexico, Tunisia,
and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
outside the Southern African Customs
Union).
Figure 1 arranges estimations of
world benefits from full trade liberaliza-
tion, as reviewed in this survey, in chrono-
logical order by date of study. It shows
that studies are finding the expected world
welfare gain becoming smaller and smaller
(or more precisely, the trend, calculated
according to a linear regression, exhibits a
decreasing slope). The average estimate of
the increase in world welfare falls from 1.7
percent in 1999 to 1.5 percent in 2002,
1.3 percent in 2004, and 0.5 percent in
2005. Is there stronger and stronger trade
pessimism among trade economists? If so,
is this conclusion justified?
Of course, these results are not totally
comparable. Models can be static or
dynamic. Dynamic models take into
account the increase in supplies of produc-
tive factors, and some simulations even
include technical progress and related
changes in factor productivity. Comparing
studies by rate of change (%) in real
income is more appropriate than by
monetary amount ($). It is even more
accurate to compare results derived from
the same model: for instance, Hertel and
Keeney (2005) can be compared with
Anderson et al. (2000), or Anderson,
Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005)
can be compared with the World Bank’s
Global Economic Prospects in 2002 and
2004. But the main conclusion is the
same: results are divergent, and the general
trend is toward greater trade pessimism.
The Origins of Trade Pessimism
Trade pessimism comes first from data on
market access. The research community
now acknowledges that simulations of full
trade liberalization need to completely





































































































Figure 1—Trade pessimism? Assessments of the impact of full trade 


















































Figure 2—Protection applied and faced by zone, 2005
Source: Author's calculation.
Note: Where a study made more than one assessment, each assessment appears separately
in the figure, and a "1" or "2" follows the study author and date.
Source: MacMap and author's calculation.regional agreements. These agreements have
changed the global picture of trade protec-
tion, making average world protection
lower than previously thought. When pref-
erences and regional agreements are not
accounted for, agriculture has an average
world protection rate of 26.8 percent.
When these trade regimes are taken into
account, it is only 19.1 percent.
Second, trade policies from industrial
countries appear less anti-development than
previously believed. In fact, they are not
regressive, as once thought, but slightly
progressive, in the sense that the poorest
countries are facing lower average duties on
their exports than richer countries. On
average, world protection is 5.6 percent. It
is 5.7 percent for developed countries’
exports and only 4.9 percent for least-
developed countries’ exports.
Figure 2 shows the average duty
applied on imports and the average duty
faced on exports for selected regions of the
modeling exercise. Developing zones, like
India, Bangladesh, and Sub-Saharan Africa,
are frequently protectionist. Global protec-
tion in rich countries is lower. Thanks to
preferential schemes like Europe’s Everything But Arms (EBA)
initiative and the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA), as well as to specialization in products little taxed across
the world (like coffee, coca, cotton, and mining), many developing
countries face low average tariffs on their exports, while they charge
high import duties. Of course, exports from developing countries
to rich countries are taxed, but much less than previously expected.
Further distortions arise from developing countries’ own policies. 
The simulation run at IFPRI using the MIRAGE model
might also explain divergences observed in the literature. The
central experiment, as simulated using the MIRAGE model,
concluded that full trade liberalization would result in a 0.33
percent increase in world real income. If the simulation had been
based on a database with no preferential schemes, it would have led
to a positive result 24 percent higher (see Figure 3).
This modeling exercise includes a pre-experiment. Why? The
purpose of this study is to assess the consequences of full trade
liberalization when implemented in 2005, but the database on
which this model is calibrated represents the world economy in
2001. As a consequence, a pre-experiment is designed to account
for the trade reforms that occurred from 2001 to 2005: the end of
the Uruguay Round, the accession of China to WTO, and the
enforcement of some preferential schemes like EBA and AGOA. If
a pre-experiment had not been included, this rate of change would
have been augmented by 36 percent: put differently, the trade
liberalization that occurred from 2001 to 2005 increases welfare
gains by 36 percent. 
Another factor that can explain divergences between studies is
the Armington elasticity, which measures the degree of substi-
tutability between domestic goods and imported goods. This para-
metrical choice is a key decision for the modeler, for its level deter-
mines how much imports will increase when tariffs are eliminated.
With higher trade elasticities, trade liberalization creates more trade
and accordingly higher real incomes.
The Armington elasticities used in IFPRI’s study come from
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) network and are based
on recent econometric work. This kind of econometric investiga-
tion remains open to methodological criticisms, but the choice is
well founded. Using higher trade elasticities (for instance, those
used in the World Bank’s LINKAGE model instead of GTAP elas-
ticities) would have increased expected benefits from trade liberal-
ization by 33 percent.
Finally, some studies are more optimistic about the impact of
trade liberalization because they include a direct and positive rela-
tionship between trade openness and total factor productivity. This
relationship makes sense: openness may accelerate the transmission
of technologies. Empirical studies broadly confirm the existence of
this link, but confirming it in this kind of econometric study raises
a number of conceptual and empirical difficulties. It is extremely
difficult today to measure precisely the intensity of this relationship
in all sectors and countries. Furthermore, a direct relationship
between trade openness and total factor productivity has not been
established on a microeconomic basis. As a result, integrating this
relationship automatically amplifies expected benefits but does not
show the channels by which trade integration raises factor produc-
tivity. The intensity and the coverage of these effects are also ques-
tionable. Implementing such a relationship in IFPRI’s assessment
of trade liberalization gives a 79 percent higher rate of change in
world welfare.
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Figure 3—Increase in world welfare rate of change compared with the
central experiment
Source: Author's calculation.
Note:TFP stands for total factor productivity.Trade Reform Is Nevertheless Highly Desirable
In a nutshell, there are two main reasons for trade pessimism: the
world is more globalized than previously expected, and some
economic linkages, especially dynamic ones, remain uncertain. But
international trade reform is nevertheless highly desirable. 
Even if expected benefits from full trade liberalization have
been revised downward, they are still positive. In the case of
certain developing countries (such as Bangladesh, China, India,
and countries in the Middle East and North Africa), the benefits
are high. Furthermore, these assessments do not even include
liberalization in services, trade facilitation, or the elimination of
some nontariff barriers (technical, sanitary, and phytosanitary
norms)—changes that could deliver additional benefits. Finally,
countries can improve the results from trade liberalization by
simultaneously putting in place domestic reforms: when markets
are more efficient and domestic institutions are more stable and
predictable, trade reform will be all the more beneficial. 
Trade reform must be very ambitious to improve welfare and
have a positive impact on development. These studies point to
several policy recommendations related to the Doha Agenda:
• Tariff cuts must be large and progressive (higher rates of
reduction on higher tariffs). On the tariff issue, a
sensitive products clause could have very negative conse-
quences on the extent of liberalization even if it concerns
a limited number of products.
• Agriculture is the main area where distortions must be cut.
• Developing countries must liberalize their own economies.
These reforms could drastically change agricultural policies in
the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and their level of output, but it is a price
worth paying to promote development and reduce poverty.
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